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The Legalization of
Prison Discipline inCanada
Michael

Mandel

Introduction
recently as 1968, a prominent Canadian
complete confidence and unanimity that:
As

court could write with

the passing of a sentence upon a convicted criminal extinguishes, for
the period of his lawful confinement, all his rights to liberty and to
thepersonal possession of propertywithin the institution inwhich he
is confined, save to the extent, if any, that those rights are expressly
preserved by thePenitentiary Act (R. v. Institutional Head of Beaver
Creek Correctional Camp, ex parte McCaud
[1969], 1 C.C.C. 371,
377, Ontario Court of Appeal).
By the end of the next decade, an even more prominent court would
subscribe with equal confidence and unanimity to the precise opposite
proposition that "a person confined to prison retains all of his civil rights,
other than those expressly or impliedly taken from him by law" (Solosky v.
The Queen [1979], 50 C.C.C.
[2d] 495, per Dickson, J., now CJ.C, for the

Supreme Court of Canada).
The intervening 11 years witnessed first a gradual and then precipitous
overthrow of a firm judicial principle?
the non-justifiability of complaints
from prisoners of abuse of power by prison and parole authorities?
that had
been inherited fromEngland and is as old as thepenitentiary system itself.The
brief period since 1979 has seen, with the entrenchment of a constitutional
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
such an acceleration in the judicial
willingness to adjudicate prisoners' claims that even the "express or implied
taking away of rights by law" is no longer any bar. In fact, the legal status of
prisoners has undergone a radical transformation.

Canada lagged some 15 years behind U.S. developments dating from the
abandonment of the "hands off doctrine in themid-1960s, firstwith respect
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to civil rights issues (Cooper v. Pate 378 U.S. 546 [1964]; Lee v.Washington
390 U.S. 333 [1968]); then jail house lawyers (Johnson v. Avery 393 U.S. 483
[1969]); limited due process in parole (Morrisey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471
[1972]), and disciplinary hearings (Wolff v.McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 [1974])
to themassive intervention of the cruel and unusual punishment cases, such as
Holt v. Sarver 309 F. Supp. 360 (1970), Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, Pugh v.
Locke 406 F. Supp. 318; Graddick v.Newman 102 S.Ct. 4 (1981).
By the mid-1970s, the limitations on the willingness of U.S. courts to

involve themselves in prison administration were, however, becoming
apparent, with such decisions as Pell v. Procunier 94 S.C. 2800 (1974) and
Saxbe v. Washington Post 94 S.Ct. 281 (1974), upholding limitations on
visiting rights;Baxter v. Palmigiano (California) 425 U.S. 308 (1974) refusing
to apply right to counsel, full cross-examination rights, and self-incrimination
protections to disciplinary proceedings; Meachum v. Fano (Massachusetts)
427 U.S. 215 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes (New York) 427 U.S. 236
(1976), refusing to apply due process requirements to disciplinary transfers;
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union 433 U.S.
119 (1977)
upholding regulations forbidding unions; Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Connecticut
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat
101 S.Ct. 2460 (1981) No. 2, holding due
on a statutory right to parole; Bell v.
in
conditional
process
parole granting
99
S.Ct.
1861
(1979), limiting applicability of cruel and unusual
Wolfish
as they were on due process indiscipline;
to
conditions
punishment
prison
Hewitt v. Helms 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983) and Hudson v. Palmer 104 S.Ct. 2194

(1984), doing the same for due process, indiscipline, and search and seizure in
prison respectively.
These developments were well known to Canadian lawyers and legal
academics who had been advocating them forCanada since the beginning of
the decade (Judson and Laidlaw, 1971; Bowie, 1971; Kaiser, 1971; Solicitor
General of Canada,
1972: 53; Price, 1974; Jackson, 1974). The influential
dissent of Chief Justice Laskin in the parole case Mitchell v. The Queen
([1975], 24 C.C.C. [2d] 241) cited U.S. authority, as did themost recent in a

130 year-long series of official investigations of abuses in the penal system,
which mainly distinguished itself from other exercises by coming out squarely
in favor of judicial review as an all-purpose remedy (Canada, House of
Commons, 1977: Chapter VII).
Canadian lawyers generally paid much attention to the activity of Ameri?
can courts from the late 1940s on. The movement for a constitutionally

entrenched Charter of Rights was inspired by it (O'Halloran, 1948; Glasbeek
andMandel, 1984) and thismovement's firstfruit, theCanadian Bill ofRights
introduced in 1960, was expressly modeled on the American Bill of Rights.
Furthermore, the postwar period saw the ever increasing influence on the
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world of American culture and institutions.This was especially so inCanada
with the explosion of U.S.
direct investment (as opposed to portfolio
investment and to direct investment from any other source, including the
U.K.), which led to the establishment of U.S. branch plants as the dominant
forces in Canadian manufacturing and resource extraction (Clement, 1975:

112-116). The influence of television, mostly American and entirely a post?
war phenomenon, should also not be discounted. Any attempt to understand
developments in Canadian prison law must consequently start by trying to
understand developments in theUnited States.
Most U.S.
students of the prisoners' rights revolution attribute great
explanatory significance to the political and social ferment of the 1960s.
According toRonald Berkman (1979: 40), "the changing political mood of the
the Vietnam War, and the
sixties, including the Civil Rights Movement,
emergence of ethnic and national movements played a decisive role." The
prison was caught up in this ferment and politicized, not in the sense of being
a political issue, which it had always been, but in the sense that crime and
punishment in general and prisons in particular were seen as the products of
conflicts of power, as coextensive with other political issues, especially the
issue of racism. This was largely the result of an influx of highly politicized
prisoners, including draft resisters, civil rights workers, and Black Muslims,
who regarded their imprisonment in political terms and who, as a
consequence, not only brought their own struggles into the prison but who
were also highly motivated
to struggle against the
and equipped
authoritarianism of the prison itself.For example, Berkman notes a change in
the demands issuing out of prison riots in the 1950s, which were mostly
concerned with basic living conditions and those of the 1960s, which were
political and even class based.
Black Muslims were especially effective in bringing their religious form of
resistance to racism into theprison and ininitiating a "new morality" of "group
time" (Jacobs, 1980: 435). Naturally, this brought theMuslims into conflict
with prison authorities; since they were able to articulate their demands in
terms of the civil rights movement, already accepted as legitimate by the
courts, and of thewell-accepted precepts of religious freedom, they achieved
the first prisoner litigation successes. This had a distinct influence on other
influential were the Warren court reforms of criminal
prisoners. Also
procedure which resulted in prisoners being released from prison for defects in
their trial procedures which prompted many prisoners to review their own
trials and litigate procedural defects in them.
Organizations and individuals outside prisons also came to regard prisons
in a different light:
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The eroding legitimacy of the state and the politicizing of many seg?
ments of the population thatwere previously powerless and apolitical
a
(college students, the poor, and racial or cultural minorities)...had
the
These
each
other
groups influence[d]
huge impact upon
prisons.
in a spiral of increasing politicization of areas of life previously
thought to be beyond the realm of political analysis and action
(Bowker, quoted inHuff, 1980: 56-57).

Left "saw prisoners as victims of capitalist and racial
oppression" (Berkman, 1979: 57):
The American

The Left's interest in the prisoners' movement gave impetus to the
struggle inside. Outside groups engaged in propaganda and support
activities in the form of defense committees forprisoners facing legal
action and direct political protest activity at the prison and
Department of Corrections. The movement inside felt less isolated.
Prisoners felt that their political activity had strong links to the
struggles of other groups in the community. These perceived links
gave politically active prisoners new inspiration to close the divisions
in the inmate body.
Perspectives

on Prisoners'

Rights

The question remains, however, why this politicization of prisons should
issue in a legal revolution, why prisoners' political claims came to be
interpretedand accepted in legal terms.Legal remedies did become more and
more available and the attitudes of judges and lawyers changed, but these
changes themselves need explanation. One explanation has been to locate the
in the "dynamics of mass
prisoners' rights movement
society," a

developmental
theory which argues that "the predominant social and
institutional norms and values in a mass society tend to be extended to include
previously marginal groups" (Huff, 1980: 51). A leading U.S. proponent of
this view is James B. Jacobs, who argues that it is "fundamental to the
realization of mass
society" that "rights of citizenship" be extended to
"heretofore marginal groups like racial minorities,
incarcerated" (Jacobs, 1977: 6):

the poor,

and

The prisoners' rightsmovement must be understood in the context of
a "fundamental democratization" which has transformedAmerican
society sinceWorld War II, and particularly since 1960. Starting with
theblack civil rights movement in themid-1950s, one marginal group
after another ?
blacks, poor people, welfare mothers, mental
?
has
patients, women, children, aliens, gays, and the handicapped

the
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pressed for admission into the societal mainstream. While each group
has its own history and a special character, the general trendhas been
to extend citizenship rights to a greater proportion of the total
population by recognizing
grievances.

the existence and legitimacy of group

Prisoners, a majority of whom are now black and poor, have identi?
fied themselves and their strugglewith other "victimized minorities,"
and pressed their claims with vigor and not a littlemoral indignation.
Various segments of the free society linked theprisoners' cause to the
plight of other powerless groups. To a considerable extent the legal
system, especially the federal district courts, accepted the legitimacy
of prisoners' claims (Jacobs, 1980: 429-470; 432).

Jacobs argues that judicial intervention has had a "great impact" and has
wrought "enormous changes" in theAmerican prison system (1980: 452^453).
In opening up a public forum for grievances, says Jacobs, the courts at once
destroyed the absolute power of the custodians and the isolation of the
prisoners. Each decision in favor of the prisoners had great symbolic
importance due to the "psychological impact" of court rhetoric in publicly
vindicating prisoners and repudiating the administration, which gave power to
themovement and demoralized its opposition. State legislatures have not only
complied with, but gone beyond court mandated changes (Ibid.: 446). Even
the recent reverses in the Supreme Court have not greatly affected the gains
made through earlier litigation because lower courts remain active in the
mostly routine enforcement of well-established rights and even oppose the
conservative trends recently emanating from the higher courts.
Overall, Jacobs hypothesizes that the prisoners' rights movement has
transformed the prison into an institutionwhich must document, rationalize,
and explain its actions, and this, in turn,has produced a new generation of
administrators who are better educated and less arbitrary.Although litigation
has had some concrete effects, such as in procedural protections, Jacobs
attributes primary significance to the heightened public awareness of prison
conditions, given that litigation is reported in themass media ("the peaceful
equivalent of a riot"), and the courts are used by progressive administrators as
a scapegoat for having to improve correctional programs. Prison welfare
benefits such as therapists, schooling, medical services, religious materials,

books, grievance mechanisms, reduced censorship, less brutal punishment,
more healthful conditions and less boredom are legitimized by litigation.1 To
the extent that they also result from the politicization of prisoners and the
heightening of their expectations, this too can be attributed to court victory, as
can the demoralization of prison staffwho become more insecure both legally
and morally in their dealings with inmates. Indeed, Jacobs cites the opposition
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of administrators to court involvement as evidence of its effectiveness. Jacobs
concludes that though prisoners are far from being established as "citizens
behind bars," nevertheless litigation has gone a long way in "liberating
prisoners from being slaves of the state" (Ibid.: 444).
JimThomas (1984) gives a more Marxist interpretationof themass society
theoryby locating litigation by marginal groups in a trend in themonopoly
phase of late capitalism towards the proliferation of legal rights through their
extension to corporations and the increasing activity of the state through law.
Thomas' rather idealistic view is that this litigation came about because these
increased rights of corporations and the state "implied obligations in that
[these] legal subjects became potential targets for litigation, thus creating a
new avenue for resolving social conflict" (Ibid.: 150). On the question of the
effect of litigation,Thomas is even more sanguine than Jacobs, arguing that in
addition to the concrete effects of successful litigation inwhich "the repressive
power of the state is directly subverted" (Ibid.: 161) there are even more
important ideological "desubordination" effects as court actions "challenge the
power, authority, and even legitimacy of the control system. Even when a
particular judicial decision is unsuccessful, the act of resistance itselfmay
have an impact on state power-apparatus" (Ibid.: 164).
This rather wild enthusiasm for court-initiated prison reform is not
universally shared by commentators. Some testify to how difficult it is to

obtain compliance with court-mandated reform (Bronstein, 1980: 40-41). Not
everyone agrees with this, however, and many observers seem to think that
therehas been general, ifgrudging and slow, compliance with the letter, ifnot

the spirit, of court-mandated reforms (Jacobs, 1977; Smith and Fried, 1974:
87-101).
The deeper issue is themeaning and effect of these reforms, even when
they are implemented. With respect to the disciplinary process, it has
frequently been observed that despite procedural, due process-type reforms,
the actual rate and level of punishment has remained unchanged (Smith and
Fried, 1974: 90; Berkman, 1979: 149). This is not surprising. It is highly
that the courts intended by their procedural reforms a
implausible

transformation in thepower structureof theprison. Motivation aside, decision
making power, after the fair procedures have been put in place, always
remains with the administration. Even to the extent that procedural reforms
tend to rationalize the actual decisions themselves, this only means that the
administration is restricted to express the legitimate interests of state (as
opposed to purely personal interests), and these interests are always to exclude
the independent interests of prisoners. That deterrence, security, and even
rehabilitation are always seen from the state's point of view has in any event
been ensured

by

the "wide-ranging

deference" which

the courts have
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consistently afforded administrators with respect to substantive, if not
procedural, decisions.
One Canadian commentator has questioned thewhole premise of the legal
due process revolution in prisons, which was based on the idea, most
?
as
and consistently refused by the courts ?
ambitiously formulated
same
as
in
that
those
the
affording prisoners
rights
disciplinary proceedings
are available to accused persons in the "ordinary criminal process." Tammy
Landau, drawing on thework of Ericson and Baranek (1982), has noted that
introducing due process into theprison on theordinary courtmodel could only
reproduce the dependency and oppression of the ordinary criminal process
where:
the accused is...better construed as a dependent rather than a defen?
dant... with few rights or opportunities to influence the chain of
events leading to a verdict of guilt in the vast majority of cases
(Landau,1984:159).
Landau

(1984:

151) also argues that:

Bringing the "rule of law" into prisons through a complex system of
laws and procedural due process can only contribute to the problem
that purports to address: a system of rules and regulations which
permits the unbridled yet legitimate discretionary powers of a third
party.

On the other hand, when we contemplate the prelitigation prison system, it
is hard to then belittle the reformswhich have been more or less secured or to
deny that they came about primarily through the impetus of the courts.
Exposing the prison to outside scrutiny deters theworst excesses of brutality
and arbitrary action, bringing the prison nearly into conformitywith juridical
norms of due process and equality before the law irrespective of race, sex,
geographical location, etc. Other things being equal, the legalized prison
should be a better prison. But are other things equal? What, in other words, is

the relationship between law and discipline in this context?
Huff (1980: 51) noted the limited nature of "mass society"-type advances
("there is no claim thatprisoners, thepoor, and racial minorities are becoming
middle class in a social economic sense"), but this did not seem to seriously
diminish his enthusiasm for such developments. Berkman's analysis suggests
that the quest for "mass society" rights has really diverted claimants from their
more fundamental claims. He argues that the early successes of the Civil
Rights Movement in attracting prisoners to itsbanner were partly owing to the
misleading promises of legality:
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The central demand of theCivil Rights Movement was the demand to
extend constitutional rights to afford blacks the same constitutional
status afforded whites. Certainly the charismatic leadership of the

movement

the abundance of media attention that it drew
enhanced its appeal. The Civil Rights Movement tended to draw a
close correlation among rights, freedom, and justice. Freedom and
justice were seen as almost mechanical outputs of a system of citi?
zenship rights. This tendency to see the accumulation and protection
of democratic rights as springboards to freedom and justice had pro?
found effects on black consciousness (Berkman, 1979: 100-101).
and

As we have seen, Landau's

critique went even furtherin arguing that legal
rights "legitimate" oppression, that is, enhance its acceptability and thereby
guarantee its continued or even expanded reproduction.
Legalization

of Politics

But this still leaves a lot to be explained. Why does legitimation, which
must always exist in one form or another, now take this legal form?What are
the specific implications of it doing so? To answer these questions, we must
put the developments in prisoners' legal rights in a wider context, namely
what Harry Glasbeek and I have called the "legalization of politics." We use
this term to designate a trend,of which the enactment of theCanadian Charter
ofRights and Freedoms is part, toward the increasing prominence of courts in
the resolution of political controversy of all sorts.
We have tried to explain and evaluate this trend by reference to the
specific accumulation and legitimation problems, noted by several authors
1973; Habermas,
1975; Wood,
1981), which confront
(e.g., O'Connor,
advanced capitalist countries in our epoch. These stem from the increasing
politicization of the accumulation process ("the economy") through increasing
state intervention. The "public" and "private" spheres become "re-coupled."
This occurs at the same time as capitalist relations of production become
increasingly dysfunctional, that is, as they increasingly stand between people
and their production and consumption needs and capabilities. This is no

coincidence; it is precisely to solve these dysfunctions that the state becomes
more and more involved in the economy. This means that increasing recourse
must be made to forms of legitimation (i.e., inways of defending a status quo
of grossly unequal social power) that are abstract in the sense that they do not
concrete needs (unlike the old efficiency
depend on meeting people's
legitimations), and that avoid genuine participatory democracy, even in the
public sphere, which in the context of state involvement in the economy might
endanger the freedom to accumulate.
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It is here that the legal system comes in, not only because of the reliability
of the courts as protectors of the social status quo, which makes litigation a
safe alternative to genuine democracy, but also because of the form of legal
discourse by which the legal profession justifies both the status quo and its
role in defending it.We argue that legalized (juridical) discourse even in late
capitalism is legitimation of a characteristically abstract typewhich suppresses
the historical and material (class) aspects of the conflicts of interest with

which it deals, by transforming them into questions of "principle" concerning
the rights of free-willing legal subjects. As contrasted with other political
institutions, courts are structurally constrained to prefer arguments of a
deontological sort to utilitarian arguments, rights to goods, principles to

policies, etc. Their increasing prominence in the resolution of political
controversy signifies a corresponding advance for their particular form of
political argument.
?
like other forms of
Legalized politics is simulated politics, intended
?
a
in
to
class
but
domesticate
way better suited to
struggle,
capitalist politics
the problems of late capitalism than other forms of politics. Thus, more and

more political power struggles find theirway into the courts to be scrutinized
according to their conformitywith judicial ideals, which, being based on equal
legal subjecthood, leave class relations untouched. This does not mean that
they are irrelevant.Equal legal citizenship can be a matter of great importance
to those excluded from it.On the other hand, by ignoring class-based social
power, equal legal citizenship not only reinforces the social status quo, but
may also even aggravate it as, for example, when corporations are treated as if
theywere simply individuals and given rights (Hunter v. Southam [1984], 11
In any event, political
[4th] 641, Supreme Court of Canada).
to
characterized by these
under
be
tends
development
legalized politics
these values, because
with
and
its
values
limited
by
conformity
juridical
can
to
to
them
be
that
conform
fails
legitimate, and this is so whether
nothing
the development occurs through the courts or outside of them.The legalization
of various realms of life tends thus to become at once a substitute for
fundamental change and an independent reinforcement of the status quo.
In Canada therewere specific local and immediate goals which were pre?

D.L.R.

eminent in thewhole process of setting thismechanism in place. This includes
the protection of minority language rights (especially English rights in
Quebec), to prevent the centrifugal forces working against theCanadian union.
The general trend to legalized politics is of unquestionable importance as the
means to this difficult specific end. Furthermore, though the economic and
cultural domination exercised by theUnited States over Canada since thewar
has obviously determined the form and pacing of the legalization of Canadian
politics, it is apparently a postwar phenomenon to be found throughout the
capitalist world in common and civil law jurisdictions alike. Thus, instead of a
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straightforward adoption of U.S.
prison law, Canadian
prison law
no
doubt
influenced
the
U.S.
is
courts, part of a gen?
by
developments, though
eral political-legal trend,most pronounced in the U.S., but meeting local
Canadian needs and shaped by local legitimation exigencies. This can explain,
for example, why in adopting the general approach of the U.S.
courts,
Canadian courts feel not only free, but also often compelled, to go theirown
way on specific matters.
The idea of the legalization of politics seems more adequate than that of
"mass society" to the task of explaining and evaluating the increasing
willingness of courts to adjudicate prisoner claims. The attitude of Canadian
courts to prison issues has certainly undergone enormous changes in the past
decade. In this sense, there has been something of a legal revolution. Prison
administrators and parole boards are increasingly called upon to justify to the

courts what they do to prisoners. And even the existence of statutory
authorization is no longer an adequate justification with the advent of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Statutes themselves and the
actions and policies of administratorsmust now pass muster with legal values.
However, the precise nature of these legal values has great implications.
Because they are entirely formal, having to do eitherwith the requirements of
administrative rationality, such as procedural requirements quite rigorously
insisted upon by Canadian Courts, or with matters of abstract citizenship such
as the right to vote (on which there are many contradictory judicial

pronouncements, but consistent governmental expansion of the right), they
leave the substance of power relations untouched. At most, they affect the
"personal" aspect of power by requiring it tobe shared between administrators
and courts. At most, they interferewith the abuse of power but not with its
exercise or existence as an objective or structural relation between prisoners
and the state. Consequently, they cannot entail an enhancement of status for
prisoners as a class, even though individuals may benefit from time to time
from jurisdictional disputes between the power-sharers. Although claims to
procedural due process in the form of fair hearings (including the right to
counsel, and no double jeopardy), have met with general success in realms
such as parole,
transfer, and
temporary absence, prison discipline,
administrative dissociation, all claims to substantive limitations on the
exercise of the same powers have failed.
So little, in fact, do legal values entail limitations on substantive power,
that the legalization of prison discipline has occurred at the same time as a
great expansion in the substantive disciplinary power of "the system." This
includes, of course, an explosion in the sheer number of persons under control
in prison, on parole or mandatory supervision;2 the increasing length of

individual prison sentences, the expansion in the powers and activities of
parole boards since the late 1950s, the proliferation of types of institutions
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from maximum tominimum security, and the easy transferbetween institu?
tions across the country and across jurisdictional boundaries; the proliferation
of different forms of imprisonment, such as the finely calibrated Special

Handling Unit system, the various temporary absence systems, and themany
other "privileges" which can make prison verymuch like life outside for some
prisoners and very much like life in hell for others. Thus, the system has
simultaneously experienced legalization and a great expansion in its flexibility
to discipline an ever larger population. This naturally raises the question of
whether the relation of court intervention to the expansion of power is more
thanmerely coincidental.
In his masterful description of 18th century English criminal law, Douglas
Hay (1975) has shown how solicitude of absurd proportions to the formal
procedural rights of accused persons helped to legitimate a system of brutal
class-based repression. This is not to argue thatprocedural guarantees should
be dismissed as a sham. However, it is a grave error to celebrate them in
abstraction from the system of power inwhich they are situated. If this error is
nevertheless easy tomake ?
it has arguably been made by Hay's colleague
E.P. Thompson ?
it is because the democratic ideals, which appeal to us in
thenotion of the "rule of law," are apt to be confused with a juridical "rule of
law" inwhich procedural guarantees are undermined by a discretionary system
wholly in thehands of the legal profession (Thompson, 1975; Mandel, 1985).

The appeal of the "rule of law" resides in the real limitations on official
power implied by it, whether this power is administrative or judicial. By
contrast, courts administering the Canadian prison system operate almost
completely without popular restraint.The Charter ofRights hardly pretends to
guide theirpower inmatters other than language rights, and the only sense in
which the legislative standards governing prisons could be said to do so is in
thewide powers they grant to prison administrators. The standards governing
parole, mandatory
supervision, earned remission, temporary absences,
transfersbetween institutions, administrative segregation, visiting rights, and
correspondence are all inscribed in legislation in unlimited discretionary
terms.

It is this system of power, with at most token popular supervision (through
Citizens'
Correctional
Committees,
Advisory
grievance
procedures,
Investigators, ombudspersons, etc., none of whom have any powers of
restraint),which Canadian courts have been legitimating even as they have
been vindicating legal values. They have done this implicitly in denying all
challenges to substantive power, but they have also gone out of theirway to
explicitly defend and justify these arrangements, combining exaggerated
security claims fed by an intense anti-prisoner rhetoric (as inRe Howard and
Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony Mountain
Institution [1985], 19 C.C.C. [3d] 195) with a romanticization of the expertise
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and devotion to duty of administrators (Ibid., Martineau No. 2 [1979], 50
C.C.C. [2d] 353 and Re Maltby et al andA-G Saskatchewan et al [1982], 2
C.C.C. [2d] 153, for example) which belies a century and a half of experience.
There has been a noticeable decline in the use of rehabilitation rhetoric to
justify ignoring the conflicting claims of prisoners (contrast Solosky v. The
[2d] 495, where it is still used, with Howard). Reha?
Queen [1979], 50 C.C.C.
bilitation is probably best regarded as the ideology of absolute nonintervention
(see Mitchell, for example). The new form of selective nonintervention relies
on a variety of abstract justifications, either in the old form of blaming the
punishment on the prisoner (e.g., Maxie v. National Parole Board, Federal
Court Trial Division, June 4, 1985, unreported; and Piche et al. v. Solicitor
General of Canada et al. [1984], 17 C.C.C. 1), or in the newer form,which
reasons from the given privations of prison to the justification of completely
gratuitous ones (e.g., Piche: double bunking justified on general lack of

privacy in prison; and Re Jolivet and Barker [1983], 1D.L.R. [4th] 604: denial
of vote justified on general lack of freedom in prison). This latter form of
reasoning seems ideally suited to carving substantive prison issues out of the
ambit of theCharter without diminishing its prestige inwhich the courts, and
theCanadian establishment in general, have considerable stake (see Howard
andMorin v. National SHU Committee et al., Federal Court of Appeal, May
15,1985 unreported, for recent judicial paeans to theCharter).
The relation of the prestige of theCharter to theprestige of the courts may
also explain the low profile of U.S. decisions in the Canadian cases, where
they act as facilitators to decisions not to intervene in substantive issues
(Maltby, Collin v. Kaplan et al. [1982], 1C.C.C. [3d] 309, and Piche citing the
latest restrictive U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on "cruel and unusual
punishment"), but no obstacles to the enforcement of legal values (Howard on
the right to counsel; Morin on the applicability of double jeopardy principles
to administrative dissociation ?
both going substantially beyond U.S. consti?
tutional law in the rights recognized).

It is worth noting, finally, that the legal values enforced by the courts (the
right to counsel, procedural rules, and judicial review in general) directly
promote the guild interests of lawyers. In this light, itmight be possible to
answer Jacobs' paradox of "both sides [namely prisoners and administrators]
claiming defeat" (Jacobs, 1980: 431) in prison litigation by conceding that
both sides may be right,with only the lawyers winning. But thiswould be too
narrow a view, ignoring as it does that lawyers are first and foremost
representatives. It is probably most helpful in this context to thinkof judges as
lawyers whose clients are the status quo. To carry this just one step further,
judges in general should not be expected to attack the status quo by turning the
prison into a democratic institution serving popular needs any more than
lawyers in general should be expected to attack theirclients.
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If legalization represents an expansion rather than a threat to the status quo
of social disciplinary power, we are still left with a prison which has
substantial differences from that described by such theorists as Foucault and
and Pavarini. In Foucault's penitentiary, punishment is "hidden"
Melossi
(Foucault, 1977: 9); "justice is relieved of responsibility for it by a bureau?
cratic concealment of the penalty itself which has become "non-juridical" or
"extra-juridical" (Ibid.: 10). The prison "is not subordinated to the court...it is
the court that is external and subordinate to the prison" (Ibid.: 308). Penal
discipline for Foucault is "a sort of counter-law" which "undermines" the
"universal juridicism of modern society" which "define[s] juridical subjects
according to universal norms" (Ibid.: 223).
Similarly, forMelossi and Pavarini the discontinuity between the juridical
and penal spheres is absolutely central because this is what most assimilates
theprison to the factory:
The central contradiction of thebourgeois universe is reflected in the
microcosm of the prison: the general juridical form which ensures a
system of egalitarian rights is neutralized by a close-knit web of
inegalitarian power-structures which reproduce those politico-socio?
economic disjunctures which negate the relations formally cemented
by the (contractual) nature of right.We thuswitness the simultaneous
existence of a right and a non- or counter-right, or indeed of con?
tractual reason and of disciplinary necessity. The contradiction at

this level...reflects the insoluble problem inherent in the capitalist
mode of production itself between the sphere of distribution or
circulation and the sphere of production or extraction of surplus
value.... If the contract of labor formally presupposes employer and
employee, as free subjects on equal terms, the actual work relation?
ship necessitates the subordination of the worker to the employer.
Similarly with the punitive relationship: "punishment as retribution"
presupposes a free man; prison commands a "slave" (Melossi and
Pavarini, 1981: 186).

In the legalized prison, however, discipline can no longer be regarded as a
"counter-law," and the autonomy and secrecy of its functioning is at least
compromised by the courts' granting of increasing juridical status to prisoners.
The distinction between the accused person in court and the convict in prison
iswithout doubt being eroded by the court's involvement in the administration
of thepenalty.
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The prison, then,has changed. But so have the institutions of capitalism to
which the prison has been assimilated by these theorists and by which they
have sought to explain it.Look, for example, at the factory.Whatever practical
similarity it bears to the factory of classical capitalism, its juridical status has
fundamentally changed. Its internal workings are no longer the "private
criminal code" of the individual capitalist, but are hemmed in by judicially
recognized legality, either in the form of legislative standards for health,
safety,minimum wages, and hours of work, or in the form of collective
agreements governing all aspects of the relationship and enforceable in the
courts (Marx, "The Struggle for a Normal Working Day," Vol. I, 1976:
375-416; Kinsey,
1979; Tucker, 1984). In other words, the distinction
between public and private spheres in general has been breaking down in late
capitalism, a result of the centralization and concentration of capital, the pres?
sures of theworking class and the consequent involvement of the state in the
economy. If this has resulted, as I argued earlier, in a general legalization of
politics, we should not be surprised that this phenomenon has penetrated the
prison or that ithas no more democratized theprison than it has the factory or
society in general.

So, the analogy of the prison and the factory is still of great importance.
Though the legalization of prison discipline has not changed the status quo of
the basic power relations either for prisoners and the state (i.e., it has not
changed the superstructural nature of the prison), or for class relations in
general, it is probably symptomatic of changes in its precise role. It cannot be
divorced, for example, from the whole "decarceration" phenomenon in
Canada. This is a phenomenon of rising per capita prison populations, whose

changing composition reflects a decreasing proportion of property offenses
and an increasing proportion of violent offenses, which is also being greatly
outstripped by the population under control outside the prison. This
diminishing relative importance of the prison and the change in its precise
function also bears striking resemblances to late capitalist developments in the
role of the factory.
All this suggests that Jacobs (1980: 432) is quite wrong to argue that the
legalization of prison discipline represents a "fundamental democratization" of
society. On the contrary, it looks a lot more like the latest in the series of
weapons used by class society in its relentless war against democracy.
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NOTES
in
Senior Coordinator Legal Component
1. A similar point was made by Alison MacPhail,
Correctional Law Review in a speech at theWorkshop
charge of the Solicitor-General of Canada's
on Legal Values
and Correctional
Practice, Faculty of Law, Queen's
University, Kingston,
November 9, 1985. She argued that although the direct effect of the Charter on prison lifemight
the indirect effect of granting legal rights to prisoners was tomake us think of them
"as people," which paved theway for larger changes.
2. From 1978-79 to 1982-83, the official average daily adult prison population in Canada
increased 22%, from 21,963 to 26,924, and thepopulation on probation and parole increased 31%,

be minimal,

to 80,912

from 61,738

(Juristat 4,5 [August, 1984]).
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